Battle of Hsiang Yang (1268-1273 AD)

The Sung dynasty in China succeeded the T'ang dynasty in 960. They came to control territory stretching from modern Manchuria to the northern borders of Vietnam and westward a thousand miles from the China Sea. In 1127 the Jurchen Mongols conquered the northern lands, so the Sung dynasty concentrated their authority in richer southern China, building a new capital city at Hangchow, at the mouth of the Yangtze River. The southern Sung dynasty was something of a golden age in China, as expanding trade routes brought immense wealth. They reintroduced Confucianism, which had been losing popularity to Buddhism and Taoism. That led to a new form of bureaucracy, with examinations on Confucian principles being the basis of gaining a position in the civil service, a practice maintained until the twentieth century. Unfortunately, the Sung dynasty was not blessed with a sufficiently strong military to be as aggressive as earlier dynasties, or even strong enough defensively to beat back the Jurchens in the early twelfth century or the Mongols under Genghis Khan a century later. Genghis was recognized as ruler in the north when his army captured Peking (Beijing) in 1215. Upon his father's death in 1227, Genghis' son Ogadai continued the conquest of rebellious northern territories. While subduing the Jurchens, Ogadai's nephew Tului gained safe passage through Sung lands to complete a wide encircling movement that led to the Jurchens' ultimate demise. For that cooperation, the Sung asked for a return of some of their lost northern territory. When the Mongols refused, the Sung forcibly annexed the province of Honan, setting off a war with the Mongols that lasted thirty-five years.

Ogadai's nephews Mangu and Kubilai directed most of the fighting against the Sung, but an invasion was postponed owing to internal political problems. Mangu succeeded Ogadai as the great khan, but his death in 1260 provoked a civil war between Kubilai, named great khan by one Mongol faction, and his brother, supported by a second group. The two fought for four years before finally Kubilai took the throne. With his position secure, Kubilai returned to his war against the southern Sung. He hoped to conquer them quickly and easily, but some Sung strongholds and generals made that hope a vain one.

Kubilai put a Sung defector, Liu Cheng, in charge of the invasion. He possessed an intimate knowledge of the primary target cities the Mongols would have to capture and experience in naval warfare. That was an aspect of fighting with which the Mongols had no knowledge but was one of the main strengths of the Sung military. Naval power coupled with the manpower of the Mongol land forces proved a potent combination. The key fortress on which Kubilai focused was Hsiang-yang, on the Han River. This city, with the almost equally strong Fan-cheng directly across the river, controlled access to the Yangtze River Valley, which the Mongols needed to reach the Sung capital at Hangchow. It proved to be one of the most difficult fortresses the Mongols ever had to attack.

During Kubilai's accession struggle, the Sung had begun preparations for the invasion. The primary figure in this was the prime minister, Chia Ssu-tao. His actions are the subject of some dispute, for the official Chinese chronicles paint him as self-centered, grasping, and corrupt, misleading his emperor as to the potency of the Mongol threat while enriching himself. Less biased observers describe him in a more favorable light, believing that his unpopularity resulted from increased taxes for military operations. Whatever the truth of the matter, Hsiang-yang was prepared when the Mongols arrived. The city's commander, Lü Wen-huan, held a strong position as well as supplies for years of isolation, plus contact via a series of bridges with the city of Fan-cheng across the Han.

Kubilai sent 60,000 veterans under Liu Cheng, which began their investment of the city in March 1268. The Mongols had built their Asian Empire on massive cavalry forces. Since the days of Genghis, however, they had been quick to adopt the technology of whatever population they conquered, so they had besieged cities before. They quickly built 10 miles of fortified lines surrounding the city, plus a fleet to stop any aid from reaching the city by river. The Mongols fortified the towns of Po-ho-k'ou and Lu-men Shan, downriver from Hsiang-yang, to harass any relief fleet sailing up the Han from the Yangtze. The city continued to receive aid from Fan-cheng, however, so in October Kubilai ordered a force under A-chu to surround that city. That created a panic in Hsiang-yang, and the Sung forces attempted a sally against them on 6 December. It was such a disaster the defenders never again left the city.

Even with Fan-cheng surrounded, the siege was irregular in its effectiveness. The perimeter was so vast a complete investment was impossible, so the Mongols shifted troops regularly. Time dragged on with neither side willing to concede defeat. In February 1269 Kubilai sent an emissary to the siege to report on its progress and make recommendations for improvement. That resulted in an extra 20,000 men to strengthen the downstream fortifications. A Sung attempt at resupply came in August 1269, with 3,000 boats, but it was easily thrown back. In April 1270 Liu Cheng and A-chu received a further 70,000 men and 5,000 ships just as Chia Ssu-tao launched another major resupply effort in October 1270; it too failed to break through.

The only success the Sung relieving forces gained was in September 1272. Two forces, one of supply ships and one of warships, made their way down a Han tributary. While the warships pinned down the Mongol fleet, a number of the supply ships along with 3,000 men reached Hsiang-yang. They brought some necessary supplies, including salt, then tried to cut their way back out of the encirclement. Apparently one of their number defected to the Mongols and the 3,000 sailed into a trap that annihilated them. The lines around the city tightened somewhat after this incident.

Increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress, Kubilai sent word to his nephew Abakha, ruling the Mongol domain in Persia. In late 1272 two Persian engineers arrived, skilled in the construction and employment of siege machinery. After surveying the situation, they oversaw the construction of a mangonel and a catapult. These were deployed in March 1273 against Fan-cheng; within a few days sufficient damage had been done to allow a successful assault against the city. "The battle raged from street to street, from house to house; and, when there was no longer any possibility of continuing the contest, the officers, sooner than surrender, slew themselves, in which they were imitated by their men. The Mongols had indeed captured Fanching [sic], but their triumph was only over a city of ruins and ashes" (Boulger, The History of China, vol. 1, p. 338). When it fell, Lü Wen-huan realized his city could not survive a similar attack. After some preliminary bombardment the Mongols offered generous terms. Lü Wen-huan accepted them, as well as an offer to serve in Kubilai's army.

The fall of Hsiang-yang turned the tide of the Mongol war against the Sung. Previously the Sung emperor and his court, confident in their defenses, had rejected Mongol emissaries. With the Han River now open to the Yangtze, the Mongols had a clear path to Hangchow. Prime Minister Chia Ssu-tao took direct command of the Sung armies in a desperate attempt to save his reputation, position, and emperor. Instead of mounting a major expedition earlier against the besieging Mongols, during which he could have cooperated with a coordinated sally from the city, he now had to face a large army under a new commander. Responding to the advice of one of his primary Chinese advisers, Kubilai placed all of his southern army under a single general, Bayan, grandson of Genghis' most gifted subordinate, Subotai. Bayan apparently inherited his forebear's military talent and he had campaigned with the Mongols in Persia and the Middle East.

Bayan moved downstream with a growing army, offering traditional Mongol terms to every town he encountered: surrender to leniency or fight to the death. Most Sung commanders chose the former alternative. The Sung emperor Tu-tsung died in August 1274 and power was in the hands of the dowager Empress Hsieh, but she was little equipped to exercise that power. Bayan defeated Chia Ssu-tao's 130,000-man army in mid-March 1275, and the final bar to Hangchow was removed. The empress tried negotiations, but after so many earlier rejections and with momentum on his side, Bayan would accept nothing less than unconditional surrender. With the Mongol army at Hangchow's gates, she finally conceded in late January 1276.

Kubilai Khan announced the end of the Sung dynasty in the midst of the siege of Hsiang-yang; in 1271 he declared the beginning of the Yuan dynasty. Although it proved relatively short-lived, Kubilai's government was not without positive accomplishments. Realizing the superiority of Chinese administration over that of the traditional Mongol state, he adapted his government to that of the conquered. The efficient civil service remained in place and the trade routes that they had used were reopened. Kubilai's dynasty permitted the uninterrupted flow of Chinese culture and bureaucracy, and gave to it a unified empire larger than it had ever encompassed. Kubilai's successors ruled badly and quarreled among themselves. A rebellion in 1368 chased the Mongols westward past the Great Wall and founded the Ming dynasty. The enlarged territory that Kubilai left to China remained for the most part the China that exists to this day.