Battle of Havana (1762 AD)

All of Europe was jealous of Spain, whose looting of the Americas had brought them untold wealth since the conquistadors in the early sixteenth century conquered the Aztec and Inca empires. After the Spanish Armada was badly beaten in 1588, however, Spain's iron grasp on the Americas began to weaken. England was quick to plant colonies in North America, but there was no gold. English pirates plundered Spanish treasure ships, but occupation of lands around the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico was necessary truly to benefit from the wealth of the western hemisphere. As time passed, the development of sugar plantations on the Caribbean islands proved virtually as lucrative as plunder, however. Unfortunately for Spain, as her fortunes waned in Europe she saw her islands ceded to other rising European powers. Through the eighteenth century, Spain still held the key to the Caribbean Sea, and all that lay behind it: the island of Cuba. The key to Cuba was the rich but well-defended port city of Havana. When Britain and France went to war in 1756, Spain remained aloof. By 1761, however, France demanded that Spain live up to its treaty commitments to assist the French throne held by a fellow Bourbon monarch. England responded by declaring war on Spain in January 1762 and quickly began making plans to attack Spanish Caribbean islands. England had controlled the island of Jamaica for a century, and it was their base of operations for strikes that quickly captured Martinique, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Tobago. London hoped that this string of successes could be crowned by the capture of Havana, and thence Cuba. An invasion fleet sailed from Portsmouth on 5 March 1762 to rendezvous with the forces recently returning from the successful capture of Martinique. The joint force comprised 19 ships-of-the-line, 18 smaller warships, and 150 transports carrying some 14,000 troops. The fleet was under the direction of Admiral Sir George Pocock; the troops were led by General George Keppel, earl of Albemarle.

Since the heyday of the pirates in the mid-1600s the Spanish had jealously guarded Havana, whose wealth became legendary. Any assault on Havana had to face the defenses of two castles that flanked the narrow entrance to the harbor, the formidable Morro Castle and its smaller sister, the Punta. The Morro was perched on high ground overlooking the entrance to the harbor, making bombardment from the seaward side extremely difficult. The Punta was lower and smaller, but to approach it from the seaward side required navigating a narrow strait while under direct fire. The Morro, being the stronger, was regarded as the key to the city's defense, in spite of the fact that it was on the opposite side of the harbor from the city. An assault on the city, it was thought, would only weaken the attacking force that would still have to assault the forts. The only way the Morro could be attacked was from the landward side, which involved crossing swampy terrain.

From Jamaica the invasion fleet had two possible avenues of approach: the southern route around Cuba was easier but longer, while the more direct route along Cuba's northern coast went through more treacherous waters. With the possibility of hurricanes to be considered, Pocock decided that time was of the essence and took the northern alternative. A pilot ship sailed to Havana and back, then guided the fleet along a safe route. When the English fleet appeared before Havana, the citizens and soldiers were unprepared. The forts had not been kept in the best state of repair and the moats around them were dry. The garrison numbered 2,330 regular troops and another 1,700 sailors aboard 15 warships, but there existed sufficient weaponry to equip only a further 3,000 militia of the 30,000 inhabitants of Havana. A junta of talented and experienced officers led by Captain General Juan de Prado commanded the defense, but the paucity of troops and the weakness of the defensive walls probably doomed the city from the outset.

Pocock sailed past the harbor entrance toward a stream west of the city, and Prado responded by sending a force there to oppose the landing. Pocock's move was a feint, however, which allowed Albemarle to land his troops against no resistance 6 miles east of the Morro Castle at the mouth of the Cojima River. His men then began the difficult advance through rough terrain. Fortunately for them, however, the Spanish did nothing to oppose this march. Prado did little other than erect a hasty redoubt on Cabaña Ridge, high ground that overlooked the Morro from the southeast. As no previous attacker had ever tried an eastern approach, the Cabaña Ridge was unfortified and the English took it with little effort on 11 June. The failure to hold that high ground was decisive for the course of the siege, for the English mounted artillery and mortars and began bombarding the Morro and Havana. They were also able to force the Spanish ships to anchor on the far side of the harbor to protect themselves. The English control of the eastern approach also meant they could cut off the water supply flowing into the fort as well as any reinforcements or supplies.

The Spanish fell into a passive defense. Their fleet of twelve ships-of-the-line and three frigates, had they sallied out and challenged the English, could have disrupted the entire operation, but Prado did nothing other than to sink three of his ships in the channel to block any possible entrance. As the guns of the forts easily protected the channel, this was a foolish move that allowed the English to move about freely and receive reinforcements while bottling up the Spanish fleet. This was proven when, on 1 July, Pocock brought up three ships to assault the fort in coordination with an assault by the troops. After a six-hour duel the English ships withdrew, badly damaged by fire from both the Morro and the Punta.

The heat and humidity were a trial to the English. "Even in the commencement of the siege, the distresses to which the soldiers were exposed, were sufficient to damp the ardour of any but the bravest; their labours were excessive; and yet they only led to severer toils. Their roads of communication were to be cut through forests that were almost impenetrable; and their heavy artillery was to be dragged, for a vast way, over a rough and rocky shore. To many their exertions and sufferings were intolerable; the powerful co-operation of labour, thirst, and excessive heat, became insupportable; they sunk beneath a complicated burden, and expired amidst the violence of their fatigues" (Coke, History of the West Indies, vol. 3, p. 274). In the wake of the ship-to-fort duel, the Spanish knocked out an artillery battery on the ridge: "The labour of 600 men for 17 days was destroyed in a few hours, and all was to be constructed anew" (p. 276). Albemarle's men, however, were able to force their way across the moat on 20 July and begin mining the Morro's walls.

On the 28th 1,400 militia from Connecticut arrived in time to aid in the defense of the batteries from the one Spanish sally. Prado gathered together a rather motley collection of 1,200 militia and threw them against the En-glish lines. Although the opening attack was a surprise, the English recovered quickly and beat back three charges. On the 30th the engineers mining the walls finally had their charges set and blew a breach in the Morro's walls. Albemarle's two brothers led the English charge and they made short work of the defenders. Luis de Velasco, commander of the Morro, died defending his flag.

Artillery from both the Cabaña and the Morro now began to rain fire onto Havana. Captain General de Prado heard rumors of an approaching French fleet and so tried to hold out as long as possible. When the rumor proved false, he asked for terms on 11 August; on that day 6,000 shells had landed in the city before he gave up. The terms were lenient: the remainder of the garrison was allowed to return to Spain, as were the commanders. The city was to suffer no looting (officially), and the citizens were to be allowed freedom of religion and protection in their persons. Cuba was declared a possession of Great Britain, although the soldiers only occupied Havana and the immediate environs. The only serious conflict was between Albemarle, who became acting governor, and the local bishop, who objected to any restriction on his authority. "Yet every Cuban authority agrees that the whole painful episode was a blessing to Havana. The Spanish system of a closed economy was overturned and bonds of all kinds were loosened.... The commercial markets thus opened were far more extensive than those afforded by Spain, and the taxes were lower. Intercourse with the Thirteen Colonies of North America was particularly lively" (Roberts, Havana, p. 48).

The occupation was of short duration, however, for the Treaty of Paris of 1763 ended the Seven Years War and as a condition of peace Cuba was returned to Spain while Spain abandoned her claims to Florida. The good economic times, however, continued, for the Cubans refused to return to the previous commercial rules imposed by Madrid. Havana itself began a major construction expansion in response to the increased trade and wealth. Cuba remained a Spanish possession until finally forfeited in 1898 in the wake of the Spanish-American War. Havana, however, remained the commercial center of both Cuba and the Caribbean and later became the political capital of the island as well.